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DISCOUNTED STOCHASTIC GAMES WITH NO STATIONARY NASH
EQUILIBRIUM: TWO EXAMPLES
Yehuda Levy∗
We present two examples of discounted stochastic games, each with a con-
tinuum of states, finitely many players and actions, that possess no stationary
equilibria. The first example has deterministic transitions - an assumption un-
dertaken in most of the early applications of dynamics games in economics - and
perfect information, and does not possess even stationary approximate equilibria
or Markovian equilibria. The second example satisfies, in addition to stronger reg-
ularity assumptions, that all transitions are absolutely continuous with respect
to a fixed measure - an assumption that has been widely used in more recent
economic applications. This assumption has been undertaken in several positive
results on the existence of stationary equilibria in special cases, and in particular
guarantees the existence of stationary approximate equilibria.
Keywords: Stochastic Game, Discounting, Stationary Equilibrium.
1. INTRODUCTION
The question of the existence of stationary equilibria in discounted stochas-
tic games with uncountable state spaces has received much attention. The
purpose of this paper is to show that such games need not possess equilibria
in stationary strategies, neither in the framework of deterministic transitions
- used in many of the early applications of dynamics games in economics -
nor in the more restricted - but much studied in recent years - setting of
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absolutely continuous continuous transitions, even when the action sets are
finite (and state-invariant), and the player set is finite.
The increasing usefulness of stochastic games in modeling economic situa-
tions, combined with the simplicity and universality of stationary strategies,
has made equilibrium existence and characterization results a very active
area of research. However, it had been unknown whether the general models
of such games did indeed possess stationary equilibria, which were known
to exist in the case of discrete state spaces.
Stochastic games were introduced by Shapley (1953). In a stochastic
game, players play in discrete stages, with stochastic transitions between
states chosen using distributions determined by the state and action. In the
β-discounted game, each player receives the β-discounted sum of the stream
of his stage-by-stage payoffs. A particular class of strategies, the stationary
strategies, in which a player makes his decision based only on the current
state, has been particularly studied in games with discounted payoffs.
There are two main reasons for this focus. First of all, stationary strate-
gies are the natural class of strategies for the discounted payoff evaluation,
as sub-games that are defined by different histories but begin at the same
state are strategically equivalent: players will have the same preferences
over plays in one sub-game as in the other. The view that strategies should
only depend on payoff-relevant data in the discounted game is highlighted
in [27], where it motivates the development of the concept of Markov Per-
fect Equilibria. In [18] this view is called the subgame-consistency principle,
which is described succinctly in [19] as “the behaviour principle according
to which a player’s behaviour in strategically equivalent subgames should be
the same, regardless of the different paths by which these subgames might
be reached.” The other main reason for focusing on the class of stationary
strategies is because of their simplicity and easy implementation; to quote
[15],“An equilibrium which does not display minimal regularity through
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time - maybe stationarity - is unlikely to generate the coordination between
agents that it assumes.”
Results for existence of equilibrium in stationary strategies have appeared
in increasing generality: [41] for zero-sum games with finite state spaces;
[26] for zero-sum games with general state spaces; [13, 45, 38, 42] for non-
zero-sum game with finite state space; [35] for non-zero-sum games with
countable state space. [43] presented an argument for the non-zero-sum
game with general state space, but the proof is flawed.1 (It is also worth
noting that existence of equilibria in general (i.e., behavioral) strategies was
established2 in [28].) A survey of these and other results can be found in
[11].
Early economic applications of stochastic games (e.g., [22, 29, 39, 6, 37])
used models with deterministic transitions, with transitions representing
changes in accumulated resource, wealth, consumer percentages, etc. How-
ever, as existence results for stationary equilibria in general classes proved to
be elusive, it became common to assume additional continuity conditions on
the transitions; in particular, many works have undertaken the assumption
which we term the absolute continuity condition, henceforth ACC, which
stipulates that all transition measures are absolutely continuous w.r.t. some
fixed measure on the state space. This and similar assumptions have been
also proven to be natural in some economic settings, e.g., [2, 9, 32, 33] and in
particular [10], where this assumption is justified by the presence of ‘noise’
in the transitions.3 (A survey of applications of stochastic games in eco-
nomics can be found in [3].) This assumption adds to the structure of the
1This was pointed out in [12].
2An alternative proof, under the absolute continuity discussed below, was given in
[40]; see also [25].
3In [10], the state space has a specific structure: a product structure. The state is
chosen then by a compound process of choosing the first coordinate and then, conditional
on that choice, the second coordinate via a distribution which is absolutely continuous.
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game, and allows for the use of tools that cannot be applied in the general
setup. Indeed, under ACC, it has been shown:
(I) There exists stationary ε-equilibria, [31].
(II) There exists stationary extensive-form correlated equilibria, [34]. (Sim-
ilar results were provided in [9] and [17].)
The purpose of this paper is to present two examples which give neg-
ative answers to the question of existence of stationary equilibria in the
deterministic model and in the ACC model, respectively.
The first example is of a discounted stochastic games with uncount-
able state space and deterministic transitions and that does not possess
ε-equilibria in stationary strategies. In addition, it satisfies other proper-
ties that contrast with other results in the literature. Specifically, for each
discount factor β > 0, we construct a game with the following properties:
(1) For ε > 0 small enough, stationary ε-equilibria do not exist.
(2) Stationary extensive-form correlated equilibria do not exist.
(3) The game has finite action spaces, perfect information,4 and determin-
istic transitions.
(4) For ε > 0 small enough, if payoffs, transitions,5 and discount factor are
perturbed less than ε the resulting game still does not possess station-
ary ε-equilibria. (A formal statement of this robustness appears at the
beginning of Section 3.)
(5) The game does not possess sub-game perfect Markovian equilibria.6
(6) For any ε > 0, there is a perturbation of our example of less than ε
which does not possess Markovian equilibria.7
4In each state, there is only one player whose action has an affect on the transitions
or the stage payoffs.
5In the total variation norm.
6Markovian strategies are those which allow players to condition their choice of mixed
action both on the current state and the number of stages played so far; see Section 3.6.
7Markovian equilibria which are not sub-game perfect do exist in the unperturbed
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(7) The state space is compact, the payoff function is continuous, and the
transitions are weakly continuous.
We remark that property (2) follows immediately from properties (1) and
(3), while property (4) follows from property (1); see Section 3.5. We further
note that the properties (I) and (II), listed above to hold in the ACC model,
contrast with properties (1) and (2) of our first example, and therefore show
that the study of the general model of stochastic games (and, in particular,
of deterministic games) is very different than that of the ACC model.
Hence, we are prompted to give a second example, which does satisfy the
ACC assumption. This example has the following stronger properties:
(1) Stationary equilibrium does not exist for any discount factor. (This
contrasts the first example, in which the construction depends on the
discount factor.)
(2) The state space is compact, payoffs are continuous, and transitions are
norm-continuous.
The construction of this example, however, is somewhat more delicate. It
relies on certain anomalies in the manifold of Nash equilibria for normal-
form games. In particular, we take advantage of the existence of a two-
person game whose set of equilibrium is homeomorphic to a circle (thus
connected but not simply connected) and each equilibrium of it is stable in
the appropriate sense; see, [21, pp. 1034].
We note that since the action spaces are finite in both examples, the tran-
sitions are trivially norm-continuous (also termed strongly continuous) in
the actions. This contrasts an example given in [17] of a two-stage extensive-
form game without an equilibrium. As [10] mentions, in representing this
example as a stochastic game, one has to allow for transitions that are not
strongly continuous on the infinite action spaces. Therefore, the example
from [17] does not fit into the models that are usually studied in works
version of the example.
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establishing equilibrium existence results.
Finally, we remark that our second example, which satisfies ACC, is eas-
ily seen not to be robust to perturbations, and can be shown to possess
Markovian equilibria. It is not known if these are implications of the ACC
condition8 or if counter-examples satisfying ACC but which either do not
possess Markovian equilibria or are robust to perturbations can be found.
In Section 2 we present the formal stochastic game model. The examples
are presented in Sections 3 and 4, with some technical proofs in the latter
section left for the appendix. Sections 3 and 4 both begin with layouts of
their contents.
2. STOCHASTIC GAME MODEL
The components of a discounted stochastic game with a continuum of
states and finitely9 many actions are the following:
• A standard Borel10 space Ω of states.
• A finite set P of players.
• A finite set of actions Ip for each p ∈ P. Denote I = ∏p∈P Ip
• A discount factor β ∈ (0, 1).
• A bounded payoff function r : Ω×I → RP, which is Borel-measurable.
• A transition function q : Ω× I → ∆(Ω), which is Borel-measurable.11
The game is played in discrete time. If z ∈ Ω is a state at some stage
of the game and the players select an action profile a ∈ I, then q(z, a) is
the conditional (given the past) probability distribution of the next state of
8Under ACC, incorrect proofs of the existence of subgame perfect Markovian equilibria
have appeared in [8] and [1].
9This is a particular case of the general model, which allows for compact actions spaces
that are state-dependent; see, e.g., [28].
10That is, a space that is homeomorphic to a Borel subset of a complete, metrizable
space.
11Where ∆(Ω), the space of regular Borel probability measures on Ω, possesses the
Borel structure induced from the topology of narrow convergence.
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the game. A stationary strategy for Player p is a behavioral strategy that
depends only on the current state; equivalently, it is a Borel-measurable12
mapping that associates with each state z ∈ Ω a probability distribution on
the set Ip.
For any profile of behavioral strategies σ = (σp)p∈P of the players and
every initial state z1 = z ∈ Ω, a probability measure P σz and a stochastic
process (zn, an)n∈N are defined on H∞ := (Ω×I)N in a canonical way, where
the random variables zn, an describe the state and the action profile chosen
by the players, respectively, in the n-th stage of the game (see, e.g., [7]).
The expected payoff vector under σ, in the game starting from state z, is:
(2.1) γσ(z) = E
σ
z
( ∞∑
n=1
βn−1r(zn, an)
)
.
Let Σp denote the set of behavioral strategies for Player p ∈ P, and Σ =∏
p∈P Σ
p. A profile σ ∈ Σ will be called a Nash equilibrium if
(2.2) γpσ(z) ≥ γp(τ,σ−p)(z), ∀p ∈ P,∀z ∈ Ω,∀τ ∈ Σp
and it will be called an ε-Nash equilibrium if
(2.3) γpσ(z) ≥ γp(τ,σ−p)(z)− ε, ∀p ∈ P, ∀z ∈ Ω,∀τ ∈ Σp
Denote, for every stationary σ ∈ Σ, every z ∈ Ω, and every a ∈∏p∈P ∆(IP ),
(2.4) Xσ(z, a) := r(z, a) + β
∫
Ω
γσ(t)dq(z, a)(t)
By way of iterations, one can show that for stationary σ ∈ Σ,
(2.5) γσ(z) = Xσ(z, σ(z)).
12The measurability is required so that the payoffs in the game be well-defined. In
certain classes of games, e.g., those with purely atomic transitions, this assumption can
be relaxed, at a cost of the constructibility of the strategies. For more on this matter,
see the discussion in [23].
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For stationary σ ∈ Σ , it is easily shown that (2.2) implies13 that
Xpσ(z, σ(z)) ≥ Xpσ(z, (b, σ−p(z))), ∀p ∈ P, ∀z ∈ Ω, b ∈ Ip(2.6)
i.e., that for all z, σ(z) is an equilibrium in the game with payoff Xσ(z, ·),
and that (2.3) implies14 that
Xpσ(z, σ(z)) ≥ Xpσ(z, (b, σ−p(z)))− ε, ∀p ∈ P, ∀z ∈ Ω,∀b ∈ Ip(2.7)
i.e., that for all z, σ(z) is an ε-Nash equilibrium in the game Xσ(z, ·).
Definition 2.0.1 A stochastic game is said to satisfy the Absolute Conti-
nuity Condition (ACC) if there is ν ∈ ∆(Ω) such that for all z ∈ Ω, a ∈ I,
q(z, a) is absolutely continuous w.r.t. ν.
Remark 2.0.2 One might think to relax the definition of Nash equilibrium
in stationary strategies in games satisfying ACC by requiring that (2.2) only
hold for ν-a.e. z ∈ Ω. However, [36] shows that existence of this weaker
equilibrium concept would imply existence of the stronger concept, via a
simple modification of the “a.e.-equilibrium” on a ν-null set.
We also mention two standard notations we will use; others will be intro-
duced as needed:
• For a bounded real-valued function f , ||f ||∞ = sup |f |, where the
supremum is taken over the entire domain of f .
• If p is a mixed action over an action space A and a ∈ A, then p[a]
denotes the probability that p chooses a.
13In fact, they are equivalent; both directions follow from standard dynamic program-
ming results.
14In the converse, (2.7) implies that σ is an ε1−β -equilibrium.
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3. EXAMPLE I (DETERMINISTIC MODEL)
In this section, we construct, for any given β ∈ (0, 1), a stochastic game
(Ω,P, (Ip), β, r, q), with deterministic transitions and perfect information,
that does not possess a stationary (measurable15) equilibrium. In fact, we
will deduce a stronger result for this game: There exists ε > 0 such that if
r′ : Ω× I → RP and q′ : Ω× I → ∆(Ω) satisfy the measurability conditions
given in the model of Section 2, and also satisfies |β′ − β| < ε and16
||r′(z, a)− r(z, a)||∞ < ε, ||q′(z, a)− q(z, a)|| < ε, ∀z ∈ Ω, ∀a ∈ I
then the game (Ω,P, (Ip), β′, r′, q′) does not possess a stationary ε-equilibrium.
Henceforth, let β ∈ (0, 1) be a fixed discount factor, let Y = {−1, 1}ω,
where ω = {0, 1, 2, . . .}, let T denote the left-shift operator on Y defined by
(Tx)n = xn+1, and let µ denote the Lebesgue measure on Y .
Section 3.1 begins with an informal description of the construction. Sec-
tion 3.2 constructs the example, and Section 3.3 presents some properties
of any approximate equilibria in it. Section 3.4 proves that no (measurable)
stationary equilibria exist in the unperturbed game, and Section 3.5 deals
with the perturbed games. Section 3.6 recalls the definition and properties
of Markovian strategies, and Section 3.7 shows how the arguments of Sec-
tions 3.3 and 3.4 can be modified to show that equilibria need not exist in
Markovian strategies. An elaboration of Section 3.7, as well as a discussion
on existence (and elimination) of non-measurable equilibria, can be found
in [23].
15The state space will be a finite product of Cantor sets (plus an isolated point), and
the measurability we refer to is with respect to the Lebesgue σ-algebra. Hence, although
we defined strategies to be Borel-measurable, we show an even stronger nonexistence
result.
16The latter distance is the total variation norm.
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3.1. An Informal Description of the Construction
We begin this description by allowing a countable set of players - one
player in each generation n ∈ ω. The state space will be ω × Y , along
with a “quitting state” 0; all payoffs are zero after the first transition to
the quitting state. The transition from a state (n, y) will either be to state
(n + 1, T (y)) or to 0. In a state (n, ∗), only Player n’s action has an effect
on either payoffs or transitions; we can think of him as the only “active”
player. Player n receives payoffs both when he is active, in state (n, y), and
in the following state, (n+ 1, T (y)) (if the game has not quit).17
Each player can play either L or R. The component of the state that
affects the structure of the payoff and transition in state (n, y) is the 0-th bit
of y, denoted κ(y). The key is that we define the payoff and transitions such
that if Player n+ 1 would play one particular action with high probability
in state (n + 1, T (y)), then Player n in state (n, y) will want to match
Player n + 1’s expected action if κ(y) = 1, and will want to mismatch it
if κ(y) = −1. Furthermore, we design the game such that regardless of the
mixed action Player n+ 1’s plans to play in state (n+ 1, T (y)), at least one
of the agents that represent Player n in the two possible states preceding
(n+ 1, T (y)) will not be indifferent between his own actions.
The modification to finitely many players is done simply: we just have the
generations repeat themselves periodically, with some period M ; the state
space becomes ({0, . . . ,M−1}×Y )∪{0}, with the generation-counter being
cyclic. If M is chosen large enough - it will depend on the discount factor
- each player will make a decision based only on the payoffs of the current
17This is reminiscent of models of overlapping generation games: each player can be
imagined as being alive for two generations. In the first generation, he is “young” and
takes an action, and receives some resulting payoff. In the second generation, he is “old”;
he does not take an action but he does receive a payoff as a result of the “young” player’s
action.
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stage and next stage when he is called to play; the payoffs from his next
“reincarnation”, M stages later, will be negligible and will not affect his
decision.
3.2. Construction
Fix δ < 1
40
, ε < δ
20
, and M ∈ N, M > 1, such that ∑∞j=M βj−1 < δ. If p
is a mixed action over an action space A and a ∈ A, then p[a] denotes the
probability that p chooses a ∈ A.
We will construct the game (Ω,P, (Ip), β, r, q). Denote Z = ωM×Y , where
ωM = {0, . . . ,M − 1}. The state space will be Ω = Z ∪ {0}, where 0 is an
absorbing18 state with payoff 0 for all players.
The set of players in the game will be P = ωM . Each player’s action set is
I = {L,R}. For n ∈ ωM , let n± = (n±1)mod M ∈ ωM , and define S : Z → Z
by S(n, y) = (n+, T (y)). Also for z = (n, y) ∈ Z, we denote:
(3.1) κ(z) = y0, n(z) = n, n
±(z) = n±
where y0 is the 0-th bit of y. The game is a game of perfect information:
that is, for each19 z ∈ Z, there is only one player, n(z), whose action has
any effect on payoffs or transitions. Fix a state z ∈ Z:
• Only n(z) and n−(z) receive non-zero payoffs in state z. That is, if
p /∈ {n(z), n−(z)}, then rp(z, ·) ≡ 0.
• The payoff to players n(z), n−(z), and the next state z′, are all deter-
mined only by the action of Player n(z) and are given by the following
rules:
18A state z ∈ Ω is called an absorbing state of q(z | z, a) = 1 for all action profiles a.
19In 0, no player’s action has an effect.
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If κ(z) = 1: If κ(z) = −1:
an(z) = L R
rn(z)(z, a) = 0 0.3
rn
−(z)(z, a) = 1
β
0
z′ = S(z) 0
an(z) = L R
rn(z)(z, a) = 0.7 0
rn
−(z)(z, a) = 1
β
0
z′ = 0 S(z)
3.3. Observations and Characterization of Equilibria
Fix a stationary ε-equilibrium profile σ of this game. Recall the notation
γσ and Xσ from Section 2. For p ∈ P and z ∈ Z ⊆ Ω, σp(z) will denote
the probability distribution on {L,R} induced by Player p’s mixed action
in state z. Recall the definition of n(z) from (3.1), and denote further that:
(3.2) `(z) = σn(z)(z)[L]
We will study the relationship between `(S(z)) and `(z). Recall that in
the game that starts at state z, the player that is active in state z, n(z),
receives a zero payoff in stages t = 2, . . . ,M . Therefore,
γn(z)σ (S(z)) = E
σ
S(z)
( ∞∑
t=1
βt−1rn(z)(zt, at)
)
= EσS(z)
(
rn(z)(S(z), a1)
)
+ EσS(z)
( ∞∑
t=M
βt−1rn(z)(zt, at)
)
.
Therefore, if
Kσ(z, ·) := rn(z)(z, ·) + βq(S(z)|z, ·)rn(z)(S(z), σ(S(z)))
the inequality β
∑∞
t=M β
t−1‖r‖∞ =
∑∞
t=M β
t−1 < δ implies that
(3.3) ||Xn(z)σ (z, ·)−Kσ(z, ·)||∞ < δ
Notation 3.3.1 Let 〈αL;αR〉, for αL, αR ∈ R, denote the single-player
decision that gives payoff αL (resp. αR) if the player plays L (resp. R).
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(3.3) shows that the decision 〈Xn(z)σ (z, L), Xn(z)σ (z, R)〉 is δ-close to the
decision 〈Kσ(z, L), Kσ(z,R)〉. Furthermore, we have
(3.4) 〈Kσ(z, L), Kσ(z, R)〉 =
 〈`(S(z)); 310〉 if κ(z) = 1〈 7
10
; `(S(z))〉 if κ(z) = −1
Lemma 3.3.2 Let z ∈ Z. If κ(z) = 1,
(3.5) `(S(z)) <
1
5
=⇒ `(z) < δ, and `(S(z)) > 2
5
=⇒ `(z) > 1− δ
and if κ(z) = −1,
(3.6) `(S(z)) <
3
5
=⇒ `(z) > 1− δ, and `(S(z)) > 4
5
=⇒ `(z) < δ
Proof: (3.3) and (3.4) show that
(3.7) ||〈Xn(z)σ (z, L);Xn(z)σ (z, R)〉 − 〈`(S(z));
3
10
〉||∞ < δ, if κ(z) = 1
(3.8) ||〈Xn(z)σ (z, L);Xn(z)σ (z, R)〉 − 〈
7
10
; `(S(z))〉||∞ < δ, if κ(z) = −1
We carry out the proof of the Lemma for the case κ(z) = 1; the other case
follows similarly. If `(S(z)) < 1
5
, then
Xn(z)σ (z, L) ≤ `(S(z)) + δ < 0.2 + δ and 0.3− δ ≤ Xn(z)σ (z,R),
implying that Xn(z)σ (z,R)−Xn(z)σ (z, L) ≥
1
10
− 2δ ≥ 1
20
The criteria (2.7) implies that playing L with probability `(z) is an ε-best-
reply in 〈Xn(z)σ (z, L);Xn(z)σ (z,R)〉, and hence `(z) < 20ε ≤ δ. On the other
hand, if `(S(z)) > 2
5
,
Xn(z)σ (z, L) ≥ `(S(z)) > 0.4− δ and 0.3 + δ ≥ Xn(z)σ (z,R),
implying that Xn(z)σ (z, L)−Xn(z)σ (z,R) ≥
1
10
− 2δ ≥ 1
20
and we similarly derive that in this case, `(z) > 1− 20ε ≥ 1− δ. Q.E.D.
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Definition 3.3.3 A state z ∈ Z will be called L-quasi-pure (resp. R-quasi-
pure) if `(z) > 1− δ (resp. `(z) < δ). If z is either L- or R-quasi-pure, we
may simply refer to z as being quasi-pure.
Lemmas 3.3.4 and 3.3.5 contain the properties of σ that we will need.
Lemma 3.3.4 If S(z) is quasi-pure in σ, then so is z. If the former is
a-quasi-pure (a ∈ {L,R}), then the latter is as well if and only if κ(z) = 1.
Proof: The lemma follows by repeated use of Lemma 3.3.2 (we shorten
’quasi-pure’ to ’q.p.’ here):
• If S(z) is L-q.p. and κ(z) = 1, then `(S(z)) < δ < 1
5
, so `(z) < δ.
• If S(z) is L-q.p. and κ(z) = −1, then `(S(z)) < δ < 3
5
, so `(z) > 1−δ.
• If S(z) is R-q.p. and κ(z) = 1, then `(S(z)) > 1−δ > 2
5
, so `(z) > 1−δ.
• If S(z) is R-q.p. and κ(z) = −1, then `(S(z)) > 1−δ > 4
5
, so `(z) < δ.
Q.E.D.
Lemma 3.3.5 For any z ∈ Z, at least one of the two states in S−1(z) is
quasi-pure. (Note that this is so even if z is not quasi-pure.)
Proof: We must have at least one of the following two inequalities:
`(S(z)) >
2
5
, `(S(z)) <
3
5
Suppose that the left inequality holds. Lemma 3.3.2 then shows that if
z′ ∈ S−1(z) with κ(z′) = 1, then `(z′) > 1− δ and hence z′ is L-quasi-pure.
In the case of the right inequality, we deduce similarly that if z′′ ∈ S−1(z)
with κ(z′′) = −1, then z′′ is also L-quasi-pure.
Q.E.D.
Remark 3.3.6 It’s easy to describe a (pure) equilibrium in behavioral
strategies: The player who begins the game plays, say, L. Thereafter, as
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long as the quitting state 0 is not reached, each player will match (resp.
mismatch) the action of the player before him if preceding state z satisfies
κ(z) = 1 (resp. κ(z) = −1). Indeed, [28] guarantees the existence of equi-
libria in behavioral strategies. In fact, the proof there in fact shows that
in perfect information games, pure behavioral equilibria exist; this had also
been demonstrated earlier in [16].
3.4. Nonexistence of Stationary Equilibria: The Unperturbed Game
Recall that µ is the Lebesgue-measure on Y , and let λ be the uniform
measure on ωM ; let ν = λ×µ. Assume that σ is a stationary ε-equilibrium,
as in Section 3.3, measurable w.r.t. ν. We shall use Lemmas 3.3.4 and 3.3.5
to show that σ cannot be a (ν-measurable20) equilibrium. Assume, to the
contrary, that it is.
Lemma 3.4.1 Let Ξ = {z ∈ Z | z is not quasi-pure}. Then ν(Ξ) = 0.
Proof: By assumption, Ξ is ν-measurable. Lemma 3.3.4 implies that
(3.9) S(Ξ) ⊆ Ξ
Let ι : Z → Z be the involution defined such that ι(n, y) is obtained from
(n, y) by changing only the 0-th bit of y. Lemma 3.3.5 then implies that
(3.10) Ξ ∩ ι(Ξ) = ∅
Furthermore, for any B ⊆ Z,
(3.11) S−1(S(B)) = B ∪ ι(B)
20Where ν is also a measure on Ω via inclusion.
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S and ι are both ν-preserving.21 Also observe that S(Ξ) is ν-measurable.22
Hence (3.9), (3.10), and (3.11) imply that
2ν(Ξ) = ν(Ξ) + ν(ι(Ξ)) = ν(S−1(S(Ξ))) = ν(S(Ξ)) ≤ ν(Ξ)
Hence, ν(Ξ) = 0. Q.E.D.
Define the map g : Z → {−1, 1} by g(z) = 1 if and only if z is L-quasi-
pure. Denote for all y, y′ ∈ Y , D(y, y′) = {j ∈ ω | yj 6= y′j}, and if D(y, y′)
is finite, N(y, y′) = #D(y, y′), M(y, y′) = maxD(y, y′).
Lemma 3.4.2 For each n ∈ ωM , µ-almost every y ∈ Y , we have
(3.12) g(n, y) = (−1)N(y,y′)g(n, y′), ∀y′ ∈ Y s.t. N(y, y′) <∞
Proof: By Lemma 3.3.4 and Lemma 3.4.1, we see that for almost every
z = (n, y) ∈ Z, g(z) = y0 · g(S(z)), and hence for all k and a.e. z,
g(z) = y0 · · · · · yk−1 · g(Sk(z))
If N(y, y′) < ∞, z = (n, y), z′ = (n, y′), then SM(y,y′)(z) = SM(y,y′)(z′) and
(−1)N(y,y′) = ∏j≤M(y,y′) yjy′j ; hence the result follows. Q.E.D.
Proposition 3.4.3 There does not exist a µ-measurable function f : Y →
{−1, 1}, such that for a.e. y ∈ Y ,
(3.13) f(y) = (−1)N(y,y′)f(y′), ∀y′ ∈ Y s.t. N(y, y′) <∞
21Recall that a mapping ψ on a measure space (Ω, λ) is measure-preserving if
λ(ψ−1(A)) = λ(A) for all λ-measurable A ⊆ Ω. ι is clearly ν-preserving, and the map
n→ n+ in ωM is clearly λ-preserving; that shifts are Lebesgue-measure preserving, and
that the product of measure-preserving systems are also measure-preserving, are standard
results in ergodic theory.
22This is easy to establish in the case that Ξ ⊆ {1} × Y or Ξ ⊆ {−1} × Y , and the
general case follows.
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Proposition 3.4.3 contradicts 3.4.2, and therefore completes our proof
that there are no stationary equilibria. Before the proof, we recall several
notions: Let Sω denote the set of permutations pi on ω such that ∃N ∈
ω,∀n > N, pi(n) = n. Sω acts on Y by (pi(y))n = ypi−1(n). A transposition
(on ω) is an element pi of Sω for which there are i, j ∈ ω with pi(i) = j and
pi(j) = i, and pi(k) = k for all k 6= i, j. It is well known that every element
of Sω is a composition of finitely many transpositions. We also denote by
χj : Y → Y the involution which changes only the j-th bit of the sequence.
Proof: Suppose that we did have such an f . Denote
L = {y ∈ Y | f(y) = 1}
Note that µ(L) = 1
2
: first, note that f(y) = −f(χ0(y)) for µ-a.e. y. Hence,
for a.e. y, exactly one of the following options holds: y ∈ L or χ0(y) ∈ L
(equivalently, y ∈ χ0(L)). Hence µ(χ0(L) ∩ L) = 0, µ(χ0(L) ∪ L) = 1.
On the other hand, let pi ∈ Sω and y ∈ Y for which (3.13) holds. We
contend that y ∈ L if and only if pi(y) ∈ L; it’s enough to check this in the
case that pi is a transposition. We have either pi(y) = y or pi(y) = χi ◦χj(y),
so N(pi(y), y) ∈ {0, 2}. Therefore, µ(pi(L)∆L) = 0 for all pi ∈ Sω, where
∆ denotes the symmetric difference of sets. By the Hewitt-Savage zero-one
law, µ(L) = 0 or µ(L) = 1, a contradiction.
Q.E.D.
3.5. Nonexistence of Stationary Equilibria: The Perturbed Games
The following lemma can be established along standard lines:
Proposition 3.5.1 Let Γ = (Ω,P, (Ip), β, r, q) be a stochastic game and
 > 0. Then there is η > 0 such that if Γ′ = (Ω,P, (Ip), β′, r′, q′) is another
game with the same state / player / action spaces, such that |β′ − β| < η,
||r′(z, a)− r(z, a)||∞ < η, ||q′(z, a)− q(z, a)|| < η, ∀z ∈ Ω, ∀a ∈ I
ectaart.cls ver. 2006/04/11 file: stochastic_game_no_eq.tex date: March 27, 2013
18
1 1
2 2
3 3
4 4
5 5
6 6
7 7
8 8
9 9
10 10
11 11
12 12
13 13
14 14
15 15
16 16
17 17
18 18
19 19
20 20
21 21
22 22
23 23
24 24
25 25
26 26
27 27
28 28
29 29
then for any behavioral strategy profile σ, letting γσ(z), γ
′
σ(z) denote the
expected payoffs in Γ,Γ′ starting with state z, we have ||γσ − γ′σ||∞ < .
It therefore follows that stationary -equilibria in Γ′ are stationary 3-
equilibria in Γ, a contradiction if 3 is small enough.
3.6. Markovian Strategies: The Concept and Dynamic Programming
A Markovian strategy is a behavioral strategy in which a player’s action
can depend on the current stage of the game23 and the current state. A
Markovian strategy σp for a player p ∈ P is given by a sequence, σp =
(σp1, σ
p
2, . . .), where for each m ∈ N, σpm is a measurable map Ω → ∆(Ip).
We will show that our example does not possess subgame perfect Marko-
vian equilibria.24 Afterwards, we will show that there are arbitrarily small
perturbations of our example that do not possess Markovian equilibria.25
We adopt the various notations of Section 2. Furthermore, if σ = (σ1, σ2, . . .)
is a Markovian strategy profile, let σ∗m be the Markovian strategy profile
(σm+1, σm+2, . . .), and we generalize the notation of Section 2 by defining
for each state z ∈ Ω, and for a mixed action profile a ∈∏p∈P ∆(IP ),
Xpσ∗m(z, a) := r(z, a) + β
∫
Ω
γσ∗m(t)dq(z, a)(t)
Proposition 3.6.1 A Markovian strategy profile σ is a subgame perfect
equilibrium iff for every state z ∈ Ω, every m ∈ N, and every z ∈ Ω,
Xpσ∗m(z, σm(z)) ≥ Xpσ∗m(z, (b, (σm)−p(z))), ∀p ∈ P,∀b ∈ Ip(3.14)
23That is, how much time has elapsed since play began.
24A similar argument can show that our example does not posses a Markovian subgame
perfect ε-equilibrium - i.e., a Markovian strategy profile which induces an ε-equilibrium
in any subgame - but we will settle for simplicity.
25The nonperturbed example possesses Markovian equilibria: for all p ∈ P, let σp1(z) =
R for κ(z) = 1 and σp1(z) = L for κ(z) = −1, let σp2(z) = R for all z, and let σpk(z) be
arbitrary for k ≥ 3.
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3.7. Nonexistence of Markovian Equilibrium in Example I
Fix some β. We will show that the game Γ = (Ω,P, {L,R}P, β, r, q) de-
fined in Section 3.2 does not have a subgame perfect Markovian equilibria.
At the end of this section we remark how to find pertubations of Γ which do
not possess Markovian equilibria. Assume, by way of contradiction, a fixed
measurable subgame perfect Markovian equilibrium profile σ.
Definition 3.7.1 For each m ∈ N, denote `m(z) = σn(z)m (z)[L]. A state
z ∈ Z will be called (L,m)-pure (resp. (R,m)-pure) if `m(z) = 1 (resp.
`m(z) = 0). If z is either (L,m)- or (R,m)-pure, we may simply refer to z
as being m-pure.
The following lemma parallels Lemmas 3.3.4 and 3.3.5, and can be de-
duced along similar lines:
Lemma 3.7.2 If S(z) is m + 1-pure, then z is m-pure. If the former is
(a,m + 1)-pure (a ∈ {L,R}), then the latter is (a,m)-pure if and only if
κ(z) = 1. Furthermore, for any z ∈ Z, m ∈ N, at least one of the two states
in S−1(z) is m-pure.
Lemma 3.7.3 For each m ∈ N, let Ξm denote the set of states which are
not m-pure. Then ν(Ξm) = 0 for all m ∈ N.
Proof: As in the proof of Lemma 3.4.1, we show that, 2ν(Ξm) = ν(S(Ξm)) ≤
ν(Ξm+1). Inductively, we see that 2
k · ν(Ξm) ≤ ν(Ξm+k), and in particular
2k · ν(Ξm) ≤ 1, for all k,m ∈ N. Hence ν(Ξm) = 0. Q.E.D.
Now, define the map g : Z → {−1, 1} by g(z) = 1 if and only if z is
(L, 1)-pure. Lemma 3.4.2 holds for g defined in this manner; by Theorem
3.4.3, such g cannot be measurable, which completes our contradiction.
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Now, let Γ′ = (Ω,P, {L,R}P, β, r, q′) be defined from Γ by
q′(z, a) = (1− ) · q(z, a) +  · δS(z),
where  > 0 and δc denotes the Dirac measure at c. Its easy to see that every
Markovian equilibrium in Γ′ is subgame-perfect, and arguments similar to
the ones above show that if  is small enough then Γ′ does not have a
subgame-perfect equilibrium.
4. EXAMPLE II (WITH ACC)
In this section, we construct a stochastic game (Ω,P, (Ip), r, q) which does
not possess a stationary equilibrium for any discount factor β ∈ (0, 1). The
game has a compact state space, a continuous payoff function, and norm-
continuous transitions.
Section 4.1 gives the idea of our construction. Section 4.2 introduces
some notation. The construction itself of the fundamental normal-form game
takes place in Sections 4.3 and 4.4, modulo a technical claim which is proved
in the Appendix. In Section 4.5, the example of a stochastic game without
a stationary equilibrium is presented. Section 4.6 discusses what minimal
anomalies of the structure of Nash equilibria we take advantage of in our
construction. (We remark that Section 4.5 can be read after having only
read the description and the properties of the normal-form game provided
in Section 4.4; it does not depend directly on Section 4.3.)
4.1. The Idea of The Construction
The game we will construct will have state space [0, 1], where 1 is an
absorbing state with payoff 0. The payoffs decrease linearly as one moves
towards 1, and the transitions from state t are of two types (or some mixture
thereof): uniformly in [t, 1), or quitting to 1. As such, the game progresses
towards the right.
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The transitions will be controlled by a particular pair of players whom
we denote C,D. These players have no influence over their stage payoff,
and each of them influences whether the game is to “continue,” i.e., if the
transition should be uniform in [t, 1), or is to “quit,” i.e., go all the way
to the absorbing state. Clearly, then, in state t < 1, each of these players
chooses which way he wishes to influence depending on whether his future
average expected payoff in the states to his right is positive or negative.
We seek to build a group of players around C,D with which to implement
a mechanism with two main properties in each state t < 1. The first property
is that the action that each of the players C,D plays in response to a
future expected positive (resp. negative) payoff in [t, 1) induces the other
players, in any stationary equilibrium, to award that player a negative (resp.
positive) stage payoff. From this mechanism (and the particular structure
of the game) it will follow that, in any stationary equilibrium, each of the
players C,D must always receive a payoff of 0. However, this contradicts
the other main property of the mechanism: the stage payoff to at least one
of the players C,D must be non-zero in any stage of play of any stationary
equilibrium.
To achieve a mechanism with both these properties, we take advantage of
an example presented in [21] in relation to stability properties of equilibria,
in which the set of equilibria is homeomorphic to a circle and all equilib-
ria satisfy an appropriate stability property. A particular pair of players,
denoted A,B, will face a game very close26 to the normal-form game in
this example, with small perturbations induced by the actions of the pair
C,D (and the resulting best-replies of a team of ‘auxiliary’ players). As a
result, in stationary equilibrium, the action pair played by A,B at any stage
will always be near the aforementioned circle of equilibria, but changes in
C,D’s action profile (as a function of expected future payoffs) will cause
26Close in the space of games, treated as a Euclidean space.
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A,B’s action pair to move to a different part of the circle, hence inducing
both properties of the mechanism that we require.
4.2. Additional Notations and Conventions
• Distances in any Euclidean spaces (including spaces of games and
spaces of mixed action profiles) are always w.r.t. to the || · ||∞ norm.
• If g is some payoff vector to some set of players P, and T ⊆ P, then
gT denotes the restriction of the vector to the players in T .
• If a is an action profile of the players in P, and T ⊆ P, then aT (resp.
a−T ) denotes the vector of strategies of players in T (resp. P\T ).
• If Λ is a normal form game on some set of players P, and α is a strategy
profile of those players, then Λ(α) denotes the resulting payoff vector.
If T ⊆ P, then ΛT (α) (resp. Λ−T (α)) denotes the payoff to the players
in T (resp. in P\T ).
• For such Λ, α, and T ⊆ P, ΛT (·, α−T ) denotes the expected normal-
form game facing the players in T when the other players are restricted
to playing α−T .
• For a normal-form game Λ, NE(Λ) is the set of Nash equilibria of Λ.
• We let S denote the boundary of the square,
(4.1) S = {(p, q) | −1 ≤ p, q ≤ 1, (|p| = 1) ∨ (|q| = 1)}.
We denote the four closed edges of S by SN, SE, SS, SW for the north,
east, south, and west edges, respectively. Note that SN = −SS, SE =
−SW.
• When referring to the set {1,−1}, for p ∈ [0, 1], (p, 1− p) denotes the
probability distribution choosing 1 with probability p, and choosing
−1 with probability 1− p.
• Given a set E and a point x in an Euclidean space,
||x− E||∞ := inf
y∈E
||x− y||∞
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4.3. Construction from Kohlberg and Mertens’ Game
In this section, we construct for each ε > 0 a continuous function Γε
from the square S to the collection of 3× 3 bimatrix games, i.e., to R2×I×J ,
where I = J = {L,M,R}, which will satisfy certain key properties that we
discuss below. The motivation for this construction is the following game
(we denote the players A,B), presented by Kohlberg and Mertens (1986),
whose set of equilibria is homeomorphic to a circle.27
(4.2)
The Game G0 Equilibria of G0
A\B L M R
L 1, 1 0,−1 −1, 1
M −1, 0 0, 0 −1, 0
R 1,−1 0,−1 −2,−2
(L,L) (L,R)
(M,M) (M,R)
(R,L) (R,M)
Table 4.2.a Figure 4.2.b
Let E1, . . . , E6 denote the 6 pure equilibria, beginning with (L,L) and
proceeding clockwise, and let Ai denote the closed arc from Ei to Ei+1,mod 6
in the space of mixed strategy profiles. The equilibria of G0 are precisely
the strategies lying on these arcs, i.e., NE(G0) = ∪6j=1Aj. For a two-player
game G, the game G′, defined by G′i(a, b) = G3−i(b, a), is the game where
the players and action profiles are switched.
Fix ε > 0; we begin by defining mappings G1, . . . , G6, GZ : [0, 1] →
R2×I×J , and from these we will define Γε. By construction, for j = 1, . . . , 6
and any t ∈ [0, 1], any equilibrium of Gj(t) lies along the closed arc Aj. (GZ ,
however, has an ‘irregularity’.)
27And is hyperstable in the sense defined there.
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•
G1(t) :=
A\B L M R
L 1 + ε, 1 + (1− t)ε ε,−1 −1 + ε, 1 + t · ε
M −1, (1− t)ε 0, 0 −1, t · ε
R 1,−1 0,−1 −2,−2
All equilibria in G1(t) lie on the arc A1.
•
G2(t) :=
A\B L M R
L 1 + (1− t)ε, 1 (1− t)ε,−1 −1 + (1− t)ε, 1 + ε
M −1, 0 t · ε, 0 −1 + t · ε, ε
R 1− t · ε, 0 −t · ε,−1 −2,−2
All equilibria of G2(t) lie along A2.
•
G3(t) :=
A\B L M R
L 1, 1− 2t · ε −t · ε,−1 −1, 1− 2(t− 1
2
)ε
M −1,−t · ε ε, t · ε −1 + ε,−2(t− 1
2
)ε
R 1− ε,−1 −ε,−1 + t · ε −2,−2
All equilibria of G3(t) lie along A3.
•
GZ(t) =
A\B L M R
L 1− 2tε, 1− 2(1− t)ε −ε,−1 −1, 1− ε
M −1,−ε ε, ε −1 + ε,−ε
R 1− ε,−1 −ε,−1 + ε −2,−2
For t < 1
2
or t > 1
2
, the unique equilibrium of GZ(t) is (M,M). More-
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over,
GZ(
1
2
) =
A\B L M R
L 1− ε, 1− ε −ε,−1 −1, 1− ε
M −1,−ε ε, ε −1 + ε,−ε
R 1− ε,−1 −ε,−1 + ε −2,−2
which has pure equilibria (L,L) and (M,M), and the mixed equilib-
rium,
(4.3) (x∗, y∗) =
(
(
2ε
2 + ε
,
2− ε
2 + ε
, 0), (
2ε
2 + ε
,
2− ε
2 + ε
, 0)
)
which satisfies
(4.4) ||(x∗, y∗)− (M,M)||∞ = 2ε
2 + ε
< ε
• Since G3(1) = G′Z(1), we retrace our steps in the transposed games;
we get
G4(t) := G
′
3(1− t)
G5(t) := G
′
2(1− t)
G6(t) := G
′
1(1− t)
In each of these cases, all equilibria of Gj lie along Aj.
We then define
(4.5) Γε(p, q) =

G4(
1
2
(1 + p)) if q = 1
G5(
1
2
(1− q)) if p = 1
G6(
1
2
(1− p)) if q = −1
G1(2(q + 1)) if p = −1, q ≤ −12
G2(2(q +
1
2
)) if p = −1,−1
2
≤ q ≤ 0
G3(2q) if p = −1, 0 ≤ q ≤ 12
GZ(2(q − 12)) if p = −1, 12 ≤ q ≤ 1
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Clearly, Γε is well-defined and continuous; one just verifiesG1(1) = G2(0), . . .,
etc. To better understand Γε, denote Hj = Gj(0) for j = 1, . . . , 6, Z. Then
the map Γε is the piecewise linear map given by the following diagram:
(4.6)
(p, q) ∈ S Γε(p, q) ∈ R2×|I|×|J |
(−1, 1) SN // (1, 1)
SE

(−1,−1)
SW
OO
(1,−1)SSoo
H4
G4 // H5
G5

HZ
GZ
OO
H3
G3
OO
H2
G2
OO
H1
G1
OO
H6G6
oo
Figure 4.6.a Figure 4.6.b
Proposition 4.3.1 For each ε > 0, we have:
(i) Γε is piecewise linear.
28
(ii) Γε is 4ε-Lipshitz (w.r.t. the ||·||∞ norm and where the distance between
points on S is given by shortest arc-length).
(iii) Γε satisfies ||Γε(x)−G0||∞ ≤ 2ε for all x ∈ S.
(iv) For any edge E of S, and for any equilibrium (x, y) of any game in
Γε(E) = {Γε(x) | x ∈ E}, it holds that
(4.7) ||Ex⊗y[ϑ]− (−E)||∞ < 2|I| · |J | · ε = 18ε
28In the sense that each edge of the square is viewed as an interval.
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where ϑ is defined by
(4.8) ϑ :=
A\B L M R
L 1, 1 0, 0 1,−1
M 0, 0 1,−1 1,−1
R −1, 1 −1,−1 0, 0
ϑ can be understood graphically:
(4.9)
Action Profile of A,B Corresponding ϑ Payoff
(R,L) Arc 6 // (L,L)
Arc 1

(L,R)
Arc 2

(M,R)
Arc 3

(R,M)
Arc 5
OO
(M,M)
Arc 4
oo
(−1, 1) Arc 6 // (1, 1)
Arc 1

(−1,−1)
Arc 5
OO
(1,−1)
Arc 4
oo
UU
Figure 4.9.a Figure 4.9.b
In addition, inequality (4.7) can be stated informally: For any equilibria
of a game assigned to a point on E via Γε, the expected payoff under ϑ is
not too far from the set of payoffs in equilibria on the edge opposite to E.
Proof: (Proof of Proposition 4.3.1) Property (i) is clear. (ii) follows (4.5),
since each of the maps G1, . . . , G6, GZ is 2ε-Lipshitz. (iii) holds since ||G−
G0||∞ ≤ 2ε whenever G ∈ Γε(S) = {Gj(t) | j = 1, . . . , 6, Z, t ∈ [0, 1]}.
(iv), as well, needs to be checked in each of the 7 segments of S used in
(4.5). Take, for example, E = SN; fix (p, q) ∈ SN. We have q = 1 and
hence Γε(p, q) is of the form G4(t) for some t ∈ [0, 1]. Any equilibrium
profile (x, y) for A,B in G4(t) lies on the arc A4, and hence Ex⊗y(ϑ) is
a convex combination of (1,−1) and (−1,−1), i.e., is of the form (s,−1),
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−1 ≤ s ≤ 1, and hence lies on SS. The other cases follow similarly, except
for the arc p = −1, 1
2
≤ q ≤ 1; here, one must use (4.4) together with the
fact that for any two strategy pairs x, y and x′, y′ for players A,B, we have
∣∣Ex⊗y[ϑ]− Ex′⊗y′ [ϑ]∣∣ ≤ |I| · |J | · ||x⊗ y − x′ ⊗ y′||∞ · (maxϑ−minϑ)
= 18||x⊗ y − x′ ⊗ y′||∞(4.10)
Q.E.D.
Remark 4.3.2 For later purposes, we remark that the upper-semicontinuity
of the Nash equilibrium correspondence implies that for each ε > 0 there
exists η = η(ε) such that if ||H − G0||∞ < η, then NE(H) is contained in
the ε-neighborhood of NE(G0).
4.4. The Normal-Form Game
In the appendix, we prove the following proposition, relying on a con-
struction given in [24]:
Proposition 4.4.1 Let I, J be finite sets,29 and let Q : S → R2×I×J be
a continuous and piecewise linear30 map to bimatrix games on these action
sets. Then for some integer M , there exist 4 normal-form games on the set
of players A,B, θ1, . . . , θM , denoted Kk for k ∈ {1,−1}2, such that:
1. A,B have action spaces I, J respectively; each θj has an action space
{L,R}. The players {θ1, . . . , θM} will be called auxiliary players.
2. The payoffs of θ1, . . . , θM are not affected by the actions of A,B in
any of the games; let KkΘ denote the well-defined restriction of K
k to
the Players θ1, . . . , θM .
29The proposition also extends, with almost no change in the proof, to the case that
Q is a map to games with any finite set of players.
30I.e., piecewise linear on each edge of S.
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3. For (p, q) ∈ [−1, 1]2, let K(p, q) (resp. KΘ(p, q)) denote the convex com-
bination of the {Kk}k (resp. {KkΘ}k), with weights given by (1+p2 , 1−p2 )⊗
(1+q
2
, 1−q
2
). If (p, q) ∈ S, and aθ is an equilibrium in the game KΘ(p, q),
then the expected payoff matrix facing A,B, given by KA,B(p, q)(·, aθ),
is Q(p, q).
4. For each ε > 0, there is κ = κ(ε) such that if ||Q(p, q) − Q0||∞ ≤ κ
for some Q0, then
||KA,B(p, q)(·, aθ)−Q0||∞ ≤ ε, ∀(p, q) ∈ [−1, 1]2,∀aθ ∈ NE(KΘ(p, q))
We now turn to our normal-form game. Fix ε ≤ min[ 1
4·|I|·|J | ,
1
2
κ(η( 1
4·|I|·|J |))] =
min[ 1
36
, 1
2
κ(η( 1
36
))], where η(·) is defined in Remark 4.3.2 and κ(·) was defined
in Proposition 4.4.1. The payoff depends on a parameter ω = (ωC , ωD) ∈ R2:
• The Players are A,B, θ1, . . . , θM , where M corresponds to Q := Γε
as in Proposition 4.4.1 and Γε was constructed in Section 4.3, as well
as an additional pair, Players C,D. (The auxiliary players θ1, . . . , θM
will not be discussed explicitly; the role they play is only through
Proposition 4.4.1. Intuitively, one can think that the players θ1, . . . , θM
help provide ‘communication’ from C,D to A,B, via their desire to
react optimally to actions taken by the former pair.)
• As in Proposition 4.4.1, Players A,B have action sets I = J =
{L,M,R}, and each player θj has action sets {L,R}; furthermore,
Players C,D each have action set {1,−1}.
• The payoff rω will be the sum of two payoffs, rω := r1 + r2,ω, defined
separately as follows:
• The first payoff function r1 does not depend on ω, satisfies rC,D1 (a) :=
ϑ[aA,B], where ϑ is defined in property (4.8) of Section 4.2, and the
payoff to the other players is the same as in the game of Proposi-
tion 4.4.1 when the profile a−{C,D} is played and the choice aC,D ∈
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{+1,−1}2 is made by Nature; namely,
rC,D1 (a) := ϑ[a
A,B], r
−{C,D}
1 (a) = K
aC,D(a−{C,D})
• The second payoff function r2,ω depends on ω. It gives a payoff of 0
to all players other than C,D: That is, r
−{C,D}
2,ω ≡ 0. To players C,D,
r2,ω is dependent only on a
C,D and is given by:
rC,D2,ω (a) =
C\D 1 −1
1 ωC , ωD 1
2
ωC , 1
2
ωD
−1 1
2
ωC , 1
2
ωD 0
(In the stochastic game - which is built around this game normal-form
game - that we will define, players C,D control the transitions but do not
influence their own stage payoffs, and ωC,D will be the expected continua-
tion payoff for these players if the game does not enter its quitting state.)
For each (p, q) ∈ S, let ap,q be an equilibrium profile in the game with
payoff rω for the players A,B, θ
1, . . . , θM when Players C,D are restricted
to playing bp,q := (
1+p
2
, 1−p
2
) ⊗ (1+q
2
, 1−q
2
); that is ap,q is an equilibrium in
r
−{C,D}
1 (·, bp,q) = r−{C,D}ω (·, bp,q). We will continue formally below, but we
give a geometric image of where we are heading: Property (3) of Proposition
4.4.1, applied to the mapping Q := Γε which has the properties given in
Proposition 4.3.1, together with Figure 4.9 gives the following relationship
between p, q and the payoff in r1 to C,D under the profile ap,q, r
C,D
1 (ap,q, bp,q):
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(4.11)
p, q r
{C,D}
1 (ap,q, bp,q)
(−1, 1) SN // (1, 1)
SE

(−1,−1)
SW
OO
(1,−1)SSoo
(1,−1) SS //

(−1,−1)
SW

oo
(1, 1)
SE
OO
// (−1, 1)SNoo
OO
Figure 4.11.a Figure 4.11.b
The diagram is to be understood in the following way: as the point (p, q)
goes around the square, the payoff rC,D1 (ap,q, bp,q) (which is not uniquely
determined) must also go ’around’ the square ’close to it’ - at a distance of
at most 18ε from the edge opposite the edge on which (p, q) lies, because of
(4.7). Formally:
Proposition 4.4.2 Let ω ∈ R2, and let a be an equilibrium profile in the
game rω. Denote p = 2a
C [1]− 1, q = 2aD[1]− 1. Then:
1. If ωC > 0, then p = 1; if ωC < 0, then p = −1. The same holds for q
w.r.t. ωD.
2. If ωC > 0, then rC1 (a) ≤ −12 . If ωC < 0, then rC1 (a) ≥ 12 . Similarly, if
ωD > 0, then rD1 (a) ≤ −12 , and if ωD < 0, then rD1 (a) ≥ 12 .
3. Let H be the expected matrix facing players A,B; that is, H = rA,Bω (·, a−{A,B}).
Then ||H −G0||∞ < η(14) (regardless of the values of ωC , ωD; this in-
cludes the case where one or both are 0), and rC,D1 (a) 6= 0.
Proof: The first part follows simply from the definition of r2,ω and since
rC,Dω − rC,D2,ω is independent of the actions of players C,D. For the second
part, take, for example, the case ωC > 0, which, by the first part, implies
p = 1. Since a ∈ NE(Q(p, q)) = NE(Γε(p, q)) ∈ ∪x∈ENE(Γε(x)), where
E = {1} × [−1, 1] = SE in this case, it follows from (4.7) that,
||rC,D1 (a)− (−SE)||∞ = ||EaA,B [ϑ]− SW||∞ < 18ε ≤
1
2
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and hence rC1 (a) ≤ −1 + 12 = −12 . The case ωC < 0, as well as the cases
ωD > 0,ωD < 0, follow similarly.
For the last part, first note that by property (iii) of Proposition 4.3.1,
||Q(p, q) − G0||∞ < 2ε ≤ κ(η( 14|I|·|J |)) for all (p, q) ∈ S. By property (4) of
Proposition 4.4.1, we see that ||H−G0||∞ < η( 14|I|·|J |), which, by definition31
of η, implies that there is an equilibrium b of G0 with ||a − b||∞ < 14|I|·|J | .
Since for any equilibrium b of G0 we have Eb[ϑ] ∈ S, we see by (4.10)
that rC,D1 (a) = ϑ[a
A,B] is in the 1
2
-neighborhood of the square S, and in
particular, rC,D1 (a) 6= 0. Q.E.D.
4.5. The Stochastic Game
The stochastic game has the following components:
• The players are P = {A,B,C,D, θ1, . . . , θM} as in Section 4.4, along
with the actions sets given there.
• The state space Ω is [0, 1], with the Borel σ-algebra.
• The payoff function r(s, ·) in state s is given by (1− s)r1(·), where r1
is defined in Section 4.4. Note that r(1, ·) ≡ 0.
• The transitions q(t, a) are controlled by Players C,D and are given
by:
q(t, a) = (1− ζ(1− t))δ1 + ζ(1− t) · q˜(t, a)
where 0 < ζ ≤ 1 is fixed and satisfies
(4.12)
ζ · ||r||∞
1− ζ <
1
2
and
q˜(t, a) =
C\D L R
L U(t, 1) 1
2
U(t, 1) + 1
2
δ1
R 1
2
U(t, 1) + 1
2
δ1 δ1
31See Remark 4.3.2.
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where U(a, b) is the uniform distribution on [a, b], and δc is the Dirac
measure at c; we interpret U(1, 1) = δ1. Note that 1 is an absorbing
state.
• β ∈ (0, 1) is a discount factor.
Remark 4.5.1 It is clear that all transitions are absolutely continuous
w.r.t. 1
2
U(0, 1) + 1
2
δ1, and hence the game satisfies ACC. Furthermore, if
one desires absolute continuity w.r.t. a non-atomic measure, we can make
the following alteration: Since 1 is an absorbing state with payoff 0 to all,
one could replace {1} with a continuum [1, 2] of absorbing states with payoff
0 to all, replacing δ1 by U(1, 2) throughout, and hence all transitions would
be absolutely continuous w.r.t the Lebesgue measure.
By way of contradiction, fix a stationary equilibrium σ. Recall the nota-
tions γσ and Xσ from Section 2. We will denote for j = C,D, V
j = γjσ and
W j(t) =
∫ 1
t
V j(s)ds. For j = C,D, (2.5) becomes
(4.13) V j(t) = Xjσ(t, σ(t)) = r
j(t, σ(t)) + βζ
(
1− q({1} | t, σ(t)))W j(t).
From the definition of the payoffs, it follows that:
Lemma 4.5.2 For 0 ≤ t ≤ 1,
Xσ(t, ·) = (1− t)rω(t)(·) + ξσ(t, ·)
where rω is defined in Section 4.4, ξ
C
σ ≡ ξDσ ≡ 0,
ξ−{C,D}σ (t, a) = βζ · (1− q({1} | t, a)) ·
∫ 1
t
γ−{C,D}σ (t)dt
and ω is given by
ω(t) = (ωC(t), ωD(t)) := ζβ ·
∫ 1
t
γ{C,D}σ (s)dq(t, σ(t)) = ζβ ·(WC(t),WD(t)).
Lemma 4.5.3 For ω as in Lemma 4.5.2, we have ||ω||∞ < 12 .
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Proof: Since q([0, 1) | ·) ≤ ζ, it follows for j ∈ {C,D},
|V j| ≤
∞∑
j=1
||r||∞ · ζj−1 = ||r||∞
1− ζ
and hence (4.12) implies that
|ωj| = |ζβ ·W j| < βζ · ||r||∞
1− ζ <
1
2
Q.E.D.
It is immediate that:
Lemma 4.5.4 Let g1, g2 be two payoff functions on the same player set,
such that for any Player p and any pair of pure action profiles a, b that
differ (at most) in Player p’s action,
gp1(a)− gp1(b) = gp2(a)− gp2(b)
Then the set of Nash equilibria under g1 is the same as the set of Nash
equilibria under g2.
Note that under ξσ(t, ·), each player’s payoff is independent of his own ac-
tion. Combining this observation with Lemma 4.5.4 (where g1(·) = Xσ(t, ·)
and g2(·) = (1− t)rω(t)(·)), Lemma 4.5.2, and Proposition 4.4.2, we deduce
that for each t ∈ [0, 1]:
• If WC(t) > 0 (resp. < 0), rC(t, σ(t)) ≤ −1
2
(resp. ≥ 1
2
).
• If WD(t) > 0 (resp. < 0), rD(t, σ(t)) ≤ −1
2
(resp. ≥ 1
2
).
• Regardless of the values of WC(t),WD(t),
(4.14) rC(t, σ(t)) 6= 0 or rD(t, σ(t)) 6= 0
Using these observations, we can further deduce that for each t ∈ [0, 1]:
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• Since Lemma 4.5.3 implies that:
(4.15) ||rC,D(t, ·)−XC,Dσ (t, ·)||∞ = ||ω(t)||∞ <
1
2
,
it follows from (4.13) that if WC(t) > 0 (resp. < 0), then V C(t) < 0
(resp. > 0), and similarly for V D w.r.t. WD.
• We deduce that for at least one j ∈ {C,D}, V j(t) 6= 0: If WC(t) =
WD(t) = 0, we deduce this from (4.14) and (4.13), while otherwise it
follows from the case above.
Furthermore, it is known that for a.e. t, dW
j
dt
(t) = −Vj(t) for j = C,D.
Define G = (WC)2 + (WD)2. Our conclusions show that for at least one
j ∈ {C,D}, W j is non-zero somewhere (otherwise, we would have V 1 ≡
V 2 ≡ 0), and hence G is not uniformly 0. Furthermore, it holds a.e. that
G′ = 2 ·W c · dW
C
dt
+ 2 ·WD · W
D
dt
≥ 0
G is absolutely continuous, because both WC ,WD are absolutely continuous
(and hence also bounded.) Therefore, since G′ ≥ 0 a.e. and G is positive at
some point, we deduce that G(1) > 0, a contradiction since G(1) = 0.
4.6. Necessary Components of Construction
As has been discussed in Section 1, the question of existence of stationary
equilibrium in discounted stochastic games under the ACC assumption has
attracted much attention. Much of this attention has resulted from the par-
ticular models used in particular economic interactions, such as capital ac-
cumulation, models with heterogeneous shocks, and others. Future research
will undoubtedly include attempts to formulate very general conditions un-
der which such equilibria do or do not exist in these models. Hence, we
briefly mention here (without proof) what components - or, more specifi-
cally, what anomalies in the manifold of Nash equilibria - are really required
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for the construction of a basic normal-form game which satisfies the prop-
erties of Proposition 4.4.2.
The multi-player normal-form game could be built around a ’base’ normal-
form game G0 (with any finite number of players) with the following prop-
erties:
(1) The set of equilibria NE0 = NE(G0) contains
32 a unique hyperstable
set H0. By a hyperstable set, defined in [21], we mean a set that is
minimal w.r.t. the following property: for any ε > 0, there is δ > 0 such
that the equilibria of any game G′ that is in a δ-neighborhood of a game
G that is equivalent33 to G0 are in an ε-neighborhood of H0.
(2) H0 is connected but not nulhomotopic.
(3) Furthermore,34 there exists:
• For some n ∈ N, a continuous semi-algebraic35 injection ψ : Cn →
H0, which is not nulhomotopic in H0, where C
n is the boundary
of the n + 1-cube: Cn = {x ∈ Rn+1 | ∃i ∈ {1, . . . , n + 1} s.t. xi ∈
{1,−1}}.
• A semi-algebraic retract ρ : NE0 → ψ(Cn).
• For all ε > 0, a semi-algebraic mapping Γε from Cn to the ε-
neighborhood of G0, such that for each edge E of C
n (i.e., E is
of the form {x ∈ Cn | xi = q} for some i and some q ∈ {−1, 1}),
any equilibrium of any game in Γε(E) is in an ε-neighborhood of
ρ−1(ψ(−E)).
32NE0 may contain other components which are not hyperstable.
33Two games are equivalent if they have the same reduced form, where the reduced
form is achieved by eliminating actions that are payoff-equivalent to a convex combination
of other actions.
34It is not clear if some of the components of Property (3) already follow from Property
(2); in view of Remark 4.6.1, this is equivalent to saying that it is not clear what regularity
conditions the manifold of Nash equilibria possess.
35See, e.g., [4].
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Remark 4.6.1 Property (3) can be viewed as a regularity condition on
the manifold of Nash equilibria near the game G0.
In our case, in which n = 1, can take ψ : S(= C2) → H0 as in Figure
4.9.a, and ρ to be the identity; Γε was defined in (4.5).
5. APPENDIX: PIECEWISE LINEAR GAMES ON THE SQUARE
In this section we prove Proposition 4.4.1. We recall the following propo-
sition from [24] (we use the notations and conventions - in particular, that
all metrics are w.r.t. the supremum norm - introduced in Section 4.2):
Proposition 5.0.2 Let f : [a, b]→ (0, 1) be a continuous, piecewise linear
function. Then there exist36 an integer N > 0 and two normal-form games,
GL and GR, on the set of players37 A,B, α1, . . . , αN−1, each with action
space {L,R}, such that for any p ∈ [a, b], denoting
G(p) :=
p− a
b− a ·G
L +
b− p
b− aG
R
it holds that in any equilibrium of G(p), Players A,B play the mixed action
profile (f(p), 1− f(p))× (f(p), 1− f(p)).
Remark 5.0.3 The construction above has other properties:
(i) The payoffs of each of the (αj) - these players will be referred to as
auxiliary players - are independent of the actions of any other player;
hence, we can refer to the matrix G(p), which is the expected matrix
facing players A,B when each of the αj plays an optimal action; this
turns out to be well-defined, as when any αj are indifferent in G(p) for
some p, any choices yield the same expected payoffs for players A,B.
36N is the number of segments into which [a, b] has to be divided into in order for f
to be linear in each segment.
37When N = 0, the set of players is just A,B.
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(ii) In fact, by construction, G(p) is uniquely determined by the value of
f at p, as it turns out that we have explicitly,
G(p) = G(f(p)), where G(t) =
L R
L 1,−1 1− 4t, 3− 4t
R 4t− 3, 4t− 1 1,−1
(iii) The construction there also shows that if L is a Lipschitz constant of
f , and ||f −f0||∞ ≤ κ for some f0, κ ∈ R, then ||(Gk)A,B−G(f0)||∞ ≤
(b− a)Lκ for k ∈ {L,R}.
Proposition 5.0.4 Let S be the boundary of the square:
S = {(p, q) | −1 ≤ p, q ≤ 1, (|p| = 1) ∨ (|q| = 1)}
and let g : S → (0, 1) be a continuous and piecewise linear38 map. Then for
some integer K, there exists four normal form games on the set of players
A,B, γ, δ, β1, . . . , βK, denoted Hk for k ∈ {1,−1}2, such that:
• A,B and also each of the (βj) has the action set {L,R}, and for each
j and each k ∈ {1,−1}2, the payoff of βj in Hk is independent of any
other player’s action.39
• γ, δ have action set {1,−1}.
• If Nature chooses k ∈ {1,−1}2 with distribution40 (1+p
2
, 1−p
2
)⊗(1+q
2
, 1−q
2
),
(p, q) ∈ S, and β1, . . . , βk all play best responses aβ1 , . . . , aβk in the
game
H(p, q) =
∑
k∈{1,−1}2
(
(
1 + p
2
,
1− p
2
)⊗ (1 + q
2
,
1− q
2
)
)
[k] · Hk
38That is, piecewise linear on each of the four edges of S.
39This is unlike the (θj) of Proposition 4.4.1, which we later prove using Proposition
5.0.4; the payoffs of θ1, . . . , θM can be affected by each other’s actions.
40Recall that (φ, 1−φ) denotes the probability distribution choosing 1 with probability
φ, and choosing −1 with probability 1− φ.
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then the expected game facing A,B, denoted
H(p, q) := (H(p, q)(·, aβ1 , . . . , aβk))A,B
is well-defined,41 and its unique equilibrium is (g(p), 1−g(p))×(g(p), 1−
g(p)).
• If L is a Lipshitz constant of g (on each edge) and |g(p, q) − g0| < ε
for all p, q ∈ S, then there is H0 such that
(5.1) ||(Hk)A,B(a)−H0||∞ ≤ 2Lε, ∀a,∀k ∈ {−1, 1}2
Proof: We denote the vertices of the square S by
V−,+ = (−1, 1) SN // V+,+ = (1, 1)
SE

V−,−(−1,−1)
SW
OO
V+,− = (1,−1)SWoo
For i ∈ {−,+}2, let i+ be such that Vi+ follows Vi in the clockwise
orientation. For i ∈ {−,+}2, let gi : [−1, 1] → R be the function of one
parameter which is the restriction of g to the arc extending clockwise from
Vi; that is, gi(0) = g(Vi) and gi(1) = g(Vi+), and gi ’behaves’ like g on the
arc from Vi to Vi+. For example, g+,+(t) = g(−t, 1), so g+,+(−1) = g(V+,+),
g+,+(1) = g(V+,−).
For j ∈ {−,+}2, let Nj correspond to gj as in Proposition 5.0.2. Then let
K =
∑
j(Nj−1); and also treatK as the set {1, . . . , K} partitioned into sub-
sets NV±,± of sizes N±,±−1. For each k ∈ {−,+}2, let Gmk , m = L,R, be the
two games that correspond to gk on the set of players A,B, β
1, . . . , βK , as in
Proposition 5.0.2 (the auxiliary players which were there denoted (αj)j<NVk
41I.e., if some βk are indifferent between actions, it doesn’t matter for players A,B
which they choose.
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are now (βj)j∈NVk - i.e., (β
j)j∈K = ∪k∈{−,+}2(αj)j<NVk , where the union is
disjoint - and βj is given a payoff of 0 in Gmk for each j /∈ NVk .) For each k ∈
{−,+}2, let Gk(t) denote the corresponding expected matrix to A,B when
auxiliary players play optimally in Gk(t); as we have mentioned in property
(i) of Remark 5.0.3, this bimatrix game is well defined, Gk(t) = G(gk(t)).
Hence, we have Gk(1) = G(gk(1)) = G(g(Vk+)) = G(gk+(−1)) = Gk+(−1).
We can now define (Hk)k from the (Gk)k as follows. First, define the
payoffs to γ, δ. For each of these players, the payoff is determined only by k
and his own action. The payoffs to γ in the various games are given by the
following table:
k = (1, 1) k = (1,−1) k = (−1,−1) k = (−1, 1)
γ plays 1 0 1 0 −1
γ plays − 1 0 −1 0 1
and the payoffs to δ by
k = (1, 1) k = (1,−1) k = (−1,−1) k = (−1, 1)
δ plays + 1 1 0 −1 0
δ plays − 1 −1 0 1 0
The diagram below describes the best-replies of γ, δ when Nature chooses
k ∈ {+1,−1}2 via the distribution (p, 1 − p) ⊗ (q, 1 − q) (with γ,δ, and
Nature making their choices simultaneously). In the diagram, this (mixed)
choice of Nature is represented by the point with coordinates (2p−1, 2q−1),
and the best-reply profile of γ, δ depends on which of the four regions in the
square Nature chooses.
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(5.2) (−1, 1) (1, 1)
·
γ=1
γ=−1
δ=−1
δ=1
δ=1
δ=−1γ=1
γ=−1
(−1,−1) (1,−1)
On one diagonal, γ will be indifferent; on the other, δ will be. More formally,
we deduce from the payoffs of γ, δ defined above that:
• If p > q (resp. <), then γ strongly prefers to play +1 (resp. −1).
• If p > 1− q (resp. <), then δ strongly prefers to play +1 (resp. −1).
Now, we define the payoffs to Players A,B, β1, . . . , βK . Given the choice
of Nature k ∈ {+1,−1}2, the actions of γ and δ determine which game
A,B, β1, . . . , βK face, as depicted in the following table (∗ denotes an arbi-
trary action):
Game Action of γ Action of δ Game Facing A,B, β1, . . . , βK
H1,1 −1 ∗ (G−,+)R
H1,1 1 ∗ (G+,+)L
H1,−1 ∗ −1 (G+,+)R
H1,−1 ∗ 1 (G+,−)L
H−1,−1 −1 ∗ (G+,−)R
H−1,−1 1 ∗ (G−,−)L
H−1,1 ∗ −1 (G−,−)R
H−1,1 ∗ 1 (G−,+)L
Since we have already noticed that Gk(1) = Gk+(0) for all k, one can
verify that these games do indeed satisfy that for any (p, q) ∈ S, the unique
equilibrium of the expected game facing A,B is (g(p), 1− g(p))× (g(p), 1−
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g(p)). For example, if (p, q) ∈ SN is an internal point of the edge, then q = 1
and −1 < p < 1. Then we will have in equilibrium γ = −1, δ = 1, and
hence,
H−{γ,δ}(p, q)(·, γ = −1, δ = 1) = H−{γ,δ}(p, 1)(·, γ = −1, δ = 1)
=
1 + p
2
(H1,1)−{γ,δ}(·, γ = −1, δ = 1)
+
1− p
2
(H−1,1)−{γ,δ}(·, γ = −1, δ = 1)
=
1− p
2
GL−,+ +
1 + p
2
GR−,+
and hence, by definition of GL−,+,G
R
−,+, and of H(p, q), we have
H(p, q) = g+,+(p) = g(p, 1) = g(p, q)
A similar arguments works for the internal points on any edge; the vertices
of S are simpler to verify.
Finally, the last property, given in (5.1), follows from part (iii) of Remark
5.0.3. Q.E.D.
Proof: (of Proposition 4.4.1) It suffices to prove the case42 0 < Q < 1;
otherwise, we will adjust Q to satisfy this normalization via an affine trans-
formation, and then apply to the inverse affine transformation to the game
we derive. For each (p, i, j) ∈ {A,B} × I × J , let Qp,i,j : S → (0, 1) be the
corresponding component of Q; and for each such piecewise linear function,
let (Hkp,i,j)k∈{1,−1}2 be the four corresponding games from Proposition 5.0.4,
on the set of players Pp,i,j := {Ap,i,j, Bp,i,j, γp,i,j, δp,i,j, β1p,i,j . . . , βNp,i,jp,i,j } for
some Np,i,j. When Nature chooses k ∈ {−1, 1}2, each set of players Pp,i,j
plays Hkp,i,j, and the payoff to Player A (resp. B) when action profile (i, j)
is played is 1 if Ap,i,j plays L, and 0 if he plays R. We then take θ
1, . . . , θM
42The strong inequalities refer to all coordinates.
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to be some enumeration of ∪p,i,jPp,i,j. Property (4) follows from the upper-
semicontinuity of the equilibrium correspondence, and by (5.1). Q.E.D.
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